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Abstract
A decision-maker has to elicit information from multiple informed experts
about a policy￿ s value. The principal may prevent communication among agents.
However, it may be in the principal￿ s interest to allow communication among
them. I assume that communication allows some synergies among experts to
emerge but also opens the possibility of collusion among them. I study the optimal
design of contracts focusing on the organization of expertise in the communication
phase. I show that, from principal￿ s point of view, when the advantages of the
synergy￿ s e⁄ects prevail over the collusion problem, communication dominates
no communication. However, this will be always true, when the principal allows
agents to communicate with each other before they make their e⁄ort choices
instead of after.
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11 Introduction
Many decisions in real life are complex and involve a multiplicity of aspects. In these
cases decision-makers rarely have the time or the skills to gather, process, and sum-
marize all the relevant information to make better decisions. Therefore, it is usually
observed that they base their decisions on the information provided by specialized ex-
perts who are hired for that speci￿c goal. In this research, the particular way in which
information is produced plays an important role. In particular, as Arrow pointed out
(1969, p.30), ￿Knowledge arises from deliberate seeking, but it also arises from obser-
vations incidental on other activities￿ .
More precisely, the goal of this article is to examine the following economic frame-
work. An uninformed principal (￿she￿ ), must elicit information from unbiased agents
(experts, ￿he￿ ) who must, in turn, decide whether or not to collect costly information
(this is for us what Arrows calls ￿deliberate seeking￿ ). After that, if agents commu-
nicate among each other, each one will obtain a more precise signal about the infor-
mation initially acquired (this is for us Arrows￿remark about ￿Knowledge...also arises
from observations incidental on other activities￿ ). Finally, this simple framework also
incorporates an opportunistic consideration of communication. I assume that commu-
nication opens the possibility of collusion among the agents against the main interest
of the principal.
Since communication has con￿ icting consequences, one question addressed in this
article is: Should principals promote or impede communication among experts? Then,
if the principal allows communication among experts, what is the best way to organize
agents who are in communication? These issues are studied in a multiagent-principal
framework when communication among agents allows not only cooperation in favor of
the principal but also collusion against her.
In our setting, the principal has to decide whether to implement a policy which has
two possible observable outcomes: success or failure. She gains access, through agents,
to noisy signals. The signals are independent conditional on the policy￿ s outcome. Each
signal has two possible values: "good news" or "bad news" about the policy￿ s success.
Each expert must gather information and send a report to the principal about the
true state of the policy. These tasks have special features: gathering information is
costly, and since reports are soft information, they are fully manipulable.1 Therefore,
experts must be given incentives to both gather and truthfully transmit precise infor-
mation.
We study and compare the principal￿ s net surplus under di⁄erent organizational
forms.
First, I compare the principal￿ s net surplus under the no communication and com-
munication case, but when it only involves its detrimental e⁄ect, i.e., potential collusion.
In such a case, the principal is better o⁄ avoiding communication among agents since
communication only imposes additional constraints on her problem.
1That is, the signal observed by agents and their reports need not coincide. Additionally, experts
are protected by limited liability.
2Then, I consider the situation in which the principal organize experts in a common
workplace. i.e., a team of experts, and thus allows communication among them. In this
case, communication has con￿ icting consequences.
On the one hand, when agents communicate with each other, signals are more precise
than in the absence of communication. This fact has not only a positive direct impact
on the principal￿ s surplus but it also makes the informational problem less severe. On
the other hand, when agents are in communication, they are able to sign contracts
contingent on information that is veri￿able inside the team, make reports that are
jointly optimal for them, and exchange side-transfers.
In contrast, when the principal prevents communication among agents, she sacri￿ces
the signals￿precision. In this circumstance, however, the principal takes advantage of
multiple reports by cross-checking them.
I ￿nd that when the signal￿ s precision is su¢ ciently increased with communication,
the principal will be better o⁄ organizing experts in a common workplace, where they
are able to exchange their knowledge, rather than avoid communication among them.
Nevertheless, this intuitive result may change as the organization of expertise changes
in the communication phase. More precisely, when should the principal allow agents to
communicate with each other? Before or after the agents gather information?
When agents are able to communicate with each other before they collect any signal,
they are not only able to manipulate the information that they reveal to the principal,
but they can also sign side contracts contingent on their decision whether or not each
one collects information.
In the case where agents can only communicate with each other after exerting e⁄ort,
they cannot coordinate their e⁄ort choices in collecting information. In such a case,
however, each agent makes that decision without information about the other agents￿
decision. Although the principal can also prevent collusion on the choice of e⁄ort in
such situations, she imposes more risk on the agents than would be imposed if each
expert had knowledge about the e⁄ort exerted by the other experts.
Therefore, when communication is permitted, I show that the best way of exploiting
the positive e⁄ect of communication is to let agents communicate with each other from
the outset. In other words, the principal￿ s welfare increases with this coalition among
experts. Consequently, when the advantages of the communication (i.e., the increase in
the signals￿precision) su¢ ciently outweigh the disadvantages of collusion, the principal
is better o⁄ allowing the agents to communication with each other from the outset,
rather than avoid communication.
The current article is linked to three lines of research: endogenous acquisition of
information, transmission of information and organization of expertise.
The literature focusing on information revelation obtains as its main result that if
there are no costs of supplying information, perfect information transmission requires
that the decision-maker and the expert have identical preferences. In this line of re-
search, Wolinsky (2002) is close to this article. The focus is on how the decision-maker
can take advantage of multiple experts. He shows that in some circumstances, allowing
partial communication among experts may result in the revelation of more information
3than either full communication or no communication.
However, in all these papers, the focus is on strategic information revelation rather
than on information acquisition. In contrast, in the current article, the decision-maker
elicits information from multiple unbiased experts, and agents must decide whether or
not to acquire information. Several authors analyze this issue in the literature. For
example, Li (2001) and Szalay (2005) examine information acquisition when players
have the same preferences but it is not possible to implement monetary incentives.
Li (2001) assumes that the precision of the signal provided by the agents increases
with e⁄ort, and he shows that the commitment to excessive conservatism in committee
decision-making can be used to increase the incentives to acquire information. Szalay
(2005) also considers that the probability to learn the state increases with e⁄ort, and
he shows that the principal ￿nds it optimal to let the agent choose the action but
excludes from the choice those actions that are optimal when no information is acquired.
However, as in the current article, Gromb and Martimort (2007), consider the design of
monetary incentives, and they study the implications of optimal incentives contracts for
the organizational design of expertise. They assume a principal, who bases her decision
on two signals about a project￿ s value, and agents, who can draw independent signals
at a ￿xed cost per signal. After receiving the signals, the agents recommend to either
undertake the project or not undertake it. They show that it is optimal to reward the
agent if his recommendation is con￿rmed by the state or by another recommendation
(con￿ icting reports are penalized).2 Subsequently, they analyze when it is optimal,
from the principal￿ s point of view, to have a single expert gathering two signals or two
experts collecting one signal each.
In the present paper, unlike Gromb and Martimort (2007), I assume that the signals￿
precision not only increases with e⁄ort (a ￿xed cost per signal) but also increases with
(horizontal) communication among agents. And, at this point, the organization of
expertise becomes crucial. With multiple agents, how should experts be organized to
ensure that they re￿ne their knowledge about the true state and fully disclose their
signals? In the current article, unlike Gromb and Martimort (2007), I analyze the
optimal organization of communication among experts. This particular feature is close
to Itoh (1993) in that the principal bene￿ts from contracting a consolidated unit whose
utility is the sum of its members￿utilities and in which employees can monitor each
other￿ s e⁄ort and coordinate their actions. Nikolova (2005) analyzes the optimal mutual
monitoring-incentive pay mix and she ￿nds that the optimal mix depends on the agents￿
liability limit.
The paper proceeds as follows. Before introducing the model, I highlight the paper￿ s
main issues by providing an example. Then, Section 2 presents the general setting, and
Section 3 contains an analysis of the optimal organization when communication does
not improve the accuracy of the signals obtained by the agents. Section 4 compares the
principal￿ s surplus when communication implies not only collusion among experts but
2K￿hler (2004) shows that this does not necessarily hold when the state and signal space are
continuous.
4also synergistic e⁄ects among them. In such a case, I study the optimality, from the
principal￿ s point of view, of two alternative organizations of communication. Namely,
communication among agents before they decide to collect information, and after they
choose whether or not to gather information. Finally, Section 5 gives the conclusions.
All proofs and details of the calculations are in the Appendix.
An example: an intelligence problem
Consider the problem faced by the Director of Intelligence of country A. The Director
has received an alert of sabotage against the tabloid press and must decide whether
or not to impose a red alert. She hires two spies who must provide information about
the likelihood of that sabotage. Let us assume that the spies work in isolation and the
agents￿identity remains unknown to each other. Each spy must decide whether or not
to collect intelligence data. After collecting data, he processes all this information and
obtains a noisy signal about the probability of an attack occurring.
For example, one of the spies might obtain information from the interception of
communications (telephone calls, e-mails, letters and so on). He processes all this data
and he obtains a signal, although some of the individuals mentioned in the telephone
calls or in the letters cannot be declared ￿dangerous￿because he has no proofs for that.
The other spy concentrates his investigations on studying information about people
who have entered and left the country in the past year. Similarly, he processes all this
data, gets a signal, but he does not ￿nd any conclusive evidence that some particular
individuals being investigated are involved in the attack on the yellow press.
The Director of Intelligence receives one signal from each agent, after which he will
make a decision. If the spies supply con￿ icting signals, the Director penalizes them,
since the state of the world is only one (i.e., sabotage or not).
However, let us assume, that the Director allows the agents to communicate with
each other. In such a case, they would mutually exchange their initial knowledge and
certain items of information that before were irrelevant would now become important
for the investigation. For example, they would realize that the names of some of the
individuals mentioned in the letters or in the telephone calls, (and that, before commu-
nication, they were irrelevant for the inquiry) match the people who have entered and
left the country in the last few months (and again, before communication, they were
impertinent for the investigation), and this coincidence could provide su¢ cient evidence
that these people are involved in the attack. Therefore, communication improves the
signals￿precision.
Nevertheless, since the spies are in communication, they may coordinate their re-
ports to show that, for example, the sabotage is only a rumor spread by the yellow
press itself but without observing it. Then, the Director￿ s problem now is whether or
not to allow communication between the spies. If the bene￿t from sharing information
outweighs the potential collusion cost, it seems reasonable that both spies work together
as a single intelligence team.
Organization of Communication. How should the spies be organized in the
5communication phase? At what point should the principal allow the agents to commu-
nicate with each other?
Before. If the spies￿identity is revealed from the outset, they may collude not only
on their reports but also in their decision about whether or not to collect information.
After. If each agent knows his partner￿ s identity only after he decides whether or
not to gather information, the Director avoids the possibility of collusion on the e⁄ort
choices, and she still takes advantage of exchange of information between the spies.
In such a case, however, each spy makes his e⁄ort decision without knowing the other
spy￿ s decision.
Consequently, the Director should decide not only whether or not she allows commu-
nication but she must also decide the optimal time for allowing the spies to communicate
with each other. I ￿nd that it is optimal, from the Director￿ s perspective, to reveal the
spies￿identity from the outset, i.e. before they make their e⁄ort choices.
2 The General Setting
I consider the relationship between one risk-neutral principal (decision-maker) and n =
2 risk neutral-agents (experts).
The decision-maker has to choose an action a 2 f0;1g, where 1 stands for imple-
menting a policy y, and 0 otherwise. The outcome of that policy y is either success or
failure, that is y 2 f0;1g. The common prior for success is Pr(y = 1) = v = 1=2.
When the policy is undertaken, it will have two possible observable monetary out-
comes; i.e., S > 0 when y = 1, or F < 0 otherwise. If the policy is not undertaken, its
outcome will not be observed.
To sum up, the principal￿ s gross payo⁄ depends on a and on an unknown state of





S if a = 1 and y = 1
F if a = 1 and y = 0
0 otherwise
We assume that, without additional information, it is not e¢ cient to implement the
policy; i.e., E [V (a;y)] = vS +(1 ￿ v)F < 0. Therefore, in such a case, the principal￿ s
optimal decision is a = 0; i.e., the status quo.
The decision-maker, however, has neither the time nor the skills to gather and
process all information related to the policy￿ s success. Therefore, she consults unbiased
agents or experts, i.e., they respond only to monetary incentives.
Each expert must simultaneously decide whether or not to exert e⁄ort; i.e., ei 2
f0;1g. In other words, each one must decide whether to gather and study information
about the policy￿ s success, i.e. ei = 1, or not, i.e., ei = 0. I assume that exerting e⁄ort
is costly, therefore c(ei = 0) = 0 and c(ei = 1) = c > 0.
6When ei = 1, expert i gets a noisy signal ￿i 2 f￿i;￿ig, where ￿i means that
the policy￿ s outcome y is more likely to be a success ("good" news), and ￿i increases
the likelihood that y may be failure ("bad" news). I assume that noisy signals are
independent conditional on the policy￿ s outcome.
The agent￿ s output is a precise report about the true state of the world. Let de￿ne
the report￿ s precision as pi (￿) ￿ p(￿ijy = 1) = p(￿ijy = 0), 8i; and let assume the
following:
Assumption 1 pi (￿) = pi (ei) 2 (0;1), and pi (ei) = pj (ej), 8 i;j such that ei = ej
with pi (ei = 0) = v and pi (ei = 1) = a > 1=2, 8i.
The Assumption says that the signal precision of agent i depends on the level of
e⁄ort supplied by agent i. Additionally, I assume that all experts are equally precise,
and if an agent chooses "shirk", i.e., ei = 0, he produces a signal which has a precision
equal to the common prior. However, if the expert chooses "work", i.e., ei = 1, he will
get a more precise signal.
After that, and before the agents send the report to the principal, they may commu-
nicate with each other. In such a case, there are two forces at play in the communication
phase. On the one hand, I assume that communication introduces the possibility of
collusion among experts. That is, after the agents accept the contract o⁄ered by the
principal, they can sign a contract contingent on veri￿able information and jointly
manipulate the information they obtain in their own interest.
On the other hand, I assume that communication increases the precision of the signal
that each agent receives. We can imagine that after agents exert some e⁄ort, they have
a "rough" idea about the true state of the world. If they were able to communicate this
preliminary knowledge with each other, they would obtain a more "re￿ned" idea about
the desirability of the principal￿ s actions. We can interpret this as the communication
among experts allows that some synergies among them to emerge.
Hence, the communication process produces a signal which has, at least, an equal
precision to no communication.
Let us de￿ne E￿i =
X
￿i
e￿i 2 [0;n ￿ 1] as the level of e⁄ort supplied by the ex-
perts who are in communication with expert i. In other words, E￿i is the number of
information sources of agent i.
Thus, when communication takes place, the ￿nal signal￿ s precision depends not only
on ei but also on E￿i. That is, pi (￿) = pi (ei;E￿i). The next assumption describes the
relationship between all these variables.
Assumption 2
































for ei = 1.
The ￿rst part of the Assumption says that the communication is only useful if the
experts have an initial idea (ei = 1) of what "they are talking about". When two experts
communicate with each other, but at least one of them has no idea about the "subject"
of the talk, the conversation is useless and the communication does not improve the
signal￿ s precision. That is, pi (0;E￿i) is equal to the common prior.
The second part of the assumption says that the signal￿ s precision is an increasing
function in the number of information sources that each agent has. In addition, it is
strictly increasing in E￿i when the agent puts some e⁄ort into collecting information,
i.e., ei = 1. In other words, the marginal productivity of his own e⁄ort increases as E￿i
increases.
And ￿nally, Part iii) states that the signal￿ s precision is a concave function in









decreases with the number of sources of information.
On the contrary, if agents do not communicate with each other, the principal avoids
the collusion problem but she cannot take advantage of the synergy e⁄ects among agents
that only emerge when they communicate with each other.
After that, the principal asks the experts to send reports. Given these messages, the
principal updates her belief about the future state of y and chooses an action. At the
end, the state of the world is realized, the transfers are paid, and payo⁄s are realized.
Finally, I assume that experts are protected by limited liability and they have the
same preferences. Thus, the expert￿ s payo⁄ function is
U (t;e) = t(￿) ￿ c(ei)
where t(￿) is the transfer that the agent receives from the principal, which we will
discuss further.





It is worth remarking that experts produce soft information which is non-veri￿able
and fully manipulable. Therefore, the principal must solve two kinds of problem: de-
sign a contract such that agents exert e⁄ort and also truthfully reveal their private
information.
In the following, I assume that two alternative organizational structures can take
place. In one of them, agents remain isolated and therefore, no exchange of information
can occur. I call this kind of organization an isolated work structure, IWS henceforth.
In the second alternative, the experts are able to communicate with each other, and I
call that a communication work structure, CWS henceforth.
83 The benchmark case: IWS versus CWS without
synergy e⁄ects
I will show that if there are no synergy e⁄ects between experts when they communicate
with each other, then the principal is better o⁄when she avoids communication between
them. In other words, when communication does not improve the signals￿quality, it
only imposes additional constraints on the principal￿ s problem.
We ￿rst characterize the optimal contract in each situation. Before introducing the
benchmark case, it is useful to present some notation and de￿nitions.
De￿nition 1 Denote by p(￿) the likelihood of ￿ 2 f￿;￿g.
For example, when an agent exerts e⁄ort, p(￿ ￿) = av + (1 ￿ a)(1 ￿ v). Likewise,
since signals are independent conditional on the policy￿ s outcome, p(￿ ￿￿ ￿) = a2v +
(1 ￿ a)
2 (1 ￿ v).
De￿nition 2 Let v (￿) be the probability of success conditional on ￿:
Therefore, v (￿) = p(y = 1j￿). That is, v (￿) =
p(￿jy=1)p(y=1)
p(￿) .
3.1 The Isolated Work Structure (IWS)
We consider now an isolated work structure of experts. That is, we are assuming that
agents do not communicate with each other. In turn, this implies that the signal each
agent obtains, ￿i, as well as whether they make e⁄ort, are not observable by other
parties, i.e. neither by the principal nor by the other experts.
The timing is as follows. The principal o⁄ers each expert a contract. Each one
accepts or rejects it. If he accepts, he decides whether or not to gather information,
and then sends a message to the principal. Given these messages, she updates her belief
about the future state of y and chooses an action. Finally, the state is realized, the
transfers are paid, and payo⁄s are realized.
Optimal Contracts
Since signals and e⁄orts are not observable by the principal, the transfers can only be
based on reports and on the policy￿ s outcome.
Let us note that the policy is only undertaken by the principal when both reports
are positive. This is because after the principal receives either two con￿ icting or two
negative signals and updates her beliefs, the optimal action will be to not undertake
the policy, i.e. v (￿￿) < v (￿￿) = v.3
3That is, v (￿￿) = p(Sj￿￿). By solving that, we get v (￿￿) =
(1￿a)
2v
(1￿a)2v+a2(1￿v), which is less than v.
Additionally, let us recall that, by assumption, vS + (1 ￿ v)F < 0.
9In the case in which the principal chooses the status quo, i.e. a = 0, the reports are
not veri￿able. However, we will see that the principal can use the correlation between
messages to extract informational rents from experts.
Thus, ￿ t is the transfer received by the expert if the policy is undertaken and it is a
success, and t is the transfer when the policy is undertaken but it fails. However, if the
policy is implemented, t0 is the transfer that each agent receives when both signals are
negative. In the event of con￿ icting reports, the expert reporting ￿ ￿ receives tg, and the
other expert, whose report is ￿, receives tb.
The contract that the principal o⁄ers must provide agents with incentives to gather
information and report it accurately.
A similar problem is solved by Gromb and Martimort (2007), henceforth GM, and
for brevity I only report optimal transfers and compute the agency cost for this orga-
nizational structure.
The optimal transfers are
t = tb = tg = 0
￿ t =
p(￿)c
v (1 ￿ v)(2a ￿ 1)a2 and t0 =
c
(1 ￿ v)(2a ￿ 1)a
while the agency cost for the isolated work structure is (TIWS)
TIWS = 2
c[p(￿) + (1 ￿ v)(2a ￿ 1)a]
(1 ￿ v)(2a ￿ 1)a
(1)
In this circumstance, as GM point out, a positive report is only rewarded when
the other report is also positive and the policy￿ s outcome is success (t = tg = 0).
Additionally, con￿ icting reports are penalized. Since signals are correlated, a negative
report is only rewarded when the other report is also negative (tb = 0).
Because of the current principal￿ s ability to cross-check reports, the expert￿ s infor-
mational rent is reduced and the agency cost is less than if there were a single agent
gathering two signals.4
3.2 The Communication Work Structure (CWS) without syn-
ergy e⁄ects
I now assume that after agents exert some level of e⁄ort to gather information, they
can communicate with each other. By now, I assume that when communication takes
place, agents can jointly manipulate their reports in their own interest. The key point
here is that communication allows agents to sign self-enforcement contracts contingent
on observable variables.5
4Gromb and Martimort (2007) say that in this case, there are "economies of scale due to the agency
costs".
5Our context assumes that there are no frictions among agents. This di⁄ers from Jeon, D.-S and
Menicucci, D. (2005). They study the optimal sale mechanism which takes into account not only
10In this case, the optimal contract is also based on reports and on the policy￿ s out-
come. Although moral hazard constraints are the same as when no communication
takes place, adverse selection constraints change and they re￿ ect the principal￿ s inabil-
ity to distinguish all pairs of reports leading to the status quo. That is, communication,
in this circumstance, only introduces additional constraints on the principal￿ s problem.
In this case, the agency cost (TCWS) is
TCWS = 2c
￿
[1 + (1 ￿ v)(2a ￿ 1)]
(1 ￿ v)(2a ￿ 1)p(￿)
￿
(2)
and ￿ t, t0, tb, tg are strictly greater than zero.6
3.3 IWS versus CWS without synergy e⁄ects: The cost of
collusion
As we see from the above discussion, the principal can provide a contract which is
robust to collusion between experts. However, doing that is costly.
That is, when the communication between experts is not possible, i.e., IWS, the
principal avoids collusion problems, and she has the ability to cross-check reports and
penalize con￿ icting reports.
On the contrary, when agents are able to communicate with each other, a coalition
or a group of experts must be given incentives to truthfully reveal the information they
obtain.
Thus, whether the principal must allow or avoid communication between agents
depends on whether the agency￿ s cost of IWS is greater or lesser than the agency￿ s cost
of CWS.
By simple manipulation, it is possible to see that
TCWS ￿ TIWS =
(2a ￿ 1)v + p(￿ ￿)[p(￿) + a(2a ￿ 1)(1 ￿ v)]
a(2a ￿ 1)(1 ￿ v)p(￿)
> 0
We can de￿ne this di⁄erence as the cost of collusion and characterize that by pro-
viding some intuition of it.
First of all, let us note that as v increases, the collusion￿ s cost also increases. That
is, as the prior of success increases, agents are more tempted to report good news (￿ ￿￿ ￿).
Consequently, they must be given more incentives to report bad news when they really
observe it, i.e., t0 ￿ v￿ t.
individual incentive compatibility but also coalition incentive compatibility. They show that, although
marginal rates of substitution are not equalized across di⁄erent types of buyers in the optimal sale
mechanism, they fail to realize the gains from arbitration because of the transaction costs in coalition
formation generated by asymmetric information.
6See Gromb and Martimort (2007).
11Second, let us observe that the cost of collusion is decreasing in a 2 (1=2;1].7 This
is because, when agents are more precise, it is easier for the principal to give experts
incentives to report good news when they observe it, i.e., v (￿ ￿￿ ￿)￿ t = a2v
p(￿ ￿￿ ￿)￿ t ￿ t0.
The following Proposition arises immediately from the above discussion.
Proposition 1 Assumes communication only involves the possibility of collusion among
agents and there are no synergy e⁄ects. The principal is better o⁄ avoiding commu-
nication among agents, since the agency cost of IWS is less than the agency cost of
CWS.
4 The organization of communication work struc-
ture with synergy e⁄ects
I now analyze the principal￿ s problem when the principal has to elicit information from
unbiased experts and, at the same time, she wants to exploit the synergy e⁄ects between
them that emerge when they are in communication.
I assume that when agents communicate with each other, there are two opposing
forces at work. On the one hand, communication allows some synergies between experts
to emerge. I assume that experts are working together and this common ￿ workplace￿
allows them to exploit some complementarities.
On the other hand, communication between experts has another e⁄ect. Experts
can jointly manipulate their reports in their own interest. Therefore, communication
allows agents to collude against the principal, and hence they may make decisions that
improve their welfare but not necessarily the well-being of the principal.
In this environment, I will study, from principal￿ s point of view, which is the best
way to exploit the complementarities among experts. To be more precise, I will answer
when it is optimal, from principal￿ s point of view, to allow agents to communicate with
each other.
4.1 Communication between experts after exerting e⁄ort
Let us assume that the principal organizes the experts in a common workplace. Thus,
they are able to communicate with each other.
Each agent simultaneously decides whether to work or shirk, i.e., gather information
or not. If he decides to exert e⁄ort, he obtains a signal ￿i 2 f￿i; ￿ ￿ig;8i = 1;2, satisfying
p(￿i = ￿ ￿ijy = 1) = p(￿i = ￿ijy = 0) = a, 8i, where a 2 (1=2;1]. The signals that each
expert captures are conditionally independent.
After gathering information, experts can communicate with each other without cost.
The communication stage delivers signals, such that p(￿i = ￿ ￿ijy = 1) = p(￿i = ￿ijy = 0) =
￿, 8i, where ￿ > a 2 (1=2;1].
7The collusion cost goes to in￿nity as a goes to 1=2, and it goes to
v(1+2(1￿v))
(1￿v)2 < 1 when a tends
to 1.
12After the communication phase, the principal asks agents for a joint report ￿A 2
f￿A; ￿ ￿Ag, where A refers to an alliance or a group of experts, according to the following:
(i) if each expert obtains ￿ ￿, they must report ￿ ￿A, or (ii) the group of experts reports
￿A otherwise. This is because v (￿￿) < v (￿￿ ￿) = v. That is, after the principal receives
two negative or con￿ icting messages, she will always decide the status quo.8
After receiving the report, the principal updates her belief about the future state
of y and chooses an action. Finally, the state is realized, the transfers are paid, and
payo⁄s are realized.
It is worth emphasizing the information available to each agent in each phase:
i Whether or not the expert gathers information is not observable either by the principal
or by the other group￿ s members.
ii The signal ￿i is not observable by the principal but it is observable by other experts
in the communication phase.
Then, as before, transfers are only based on reports and on the policy￿ s outcome.
Thus, when experts report ￿ ￿A, the policy is undertaken and each expert receives ￿ t if
the policy is a success.9 When experts report ￿A, the policy is not undertaken, and
each agent receives t0.
Optimal Contracts
The principal must provide incentives to each expert to acquire information and also
reveal it truthfully.
Moral hazard incentive constraints on gathering information are such that each
expert will not prefer to remain uninformed and report ￿:
p(￿ ￿A)v (￿ ￿A)￿ t + (1 ￿ p(￿ ￿A))t0 ￿ c ￿ t0 (3)
or ￿ ￿, that is,
p(￿ ￿A)v (￿ ￿A)￿ t + (1 ￿ p(￿ ￿A))t0 ￿ c ￿ p(￿ ￿)v (￿ ￿)￿ t + p(￿)t0 (4)
Additionally, when experts, who are in communication, observe ￿ ￿￿ ￿, they should not
prefer to report ￿A:
2v (￿ ￿A)￿ t ￿ 2t0 (5)
and, when they observe ￿￿ or ￿￿ ￿, they should prefer to report that rather than ￿ ￿A
2t0 ￿ 2v￿ t10 (6)
8Recall that, by assumption, vS + (1 ￿ v)F < 0.
9Gromb and Martimort (2007) show that t = 0 is optimal in our context.
10Recall that v (￿￿) < v (￿￿ ￿) = v.
13The other constraints on the principal￿ s problem are: (i) the incentive participation
constraint for each group￿ s member,
p(￿ ￿A)v (￿ ￿A)￿ t + (1 ￿ p(￿ ￿A))t0 ￿ c ￿ 0 (7)
and (ii) the limited liability constraints
￿ t;t0 ￿ 0 (8)
Then, the principal￿ s program is:
minp(￿ ￿A)v (￿ ￿A)￿ t + (1 ￿ p(￿ ￿A))t0
subject to (3)-(8).
Lemma 1 The optimal transfers are
￿ t =
c
2v (1 ￿ v)(￿ ￿ a)
and t0 =
c
2(1 ￿ v)(￿ ￿ a)
Likewise, the agency cost when communication takes place after agents exert e⁄ort
TCWS(F) is
TCWS(F) =
c[1 + (1 ￿ v)(2￿ ￿ 1)]
(1 ￿ v)(￿ ￿ a)
(9)
The principal￿ s net surplus is
￿
2vS + (1 ￿ ￿)
2 (1 ￿ v)F ￿ TCWS(F)
In this case, agents are always better o⁄ by gathering information rather than not
exerting e⁄ort and reporting bad news. Additionally, as we can see from (9), when the
communication increases the signal￿ s precision the agency cost decreases.
4.2 Communication between experts before exerting e⁄ort
I now introduce some changes to the expert￿ s organization described in the preceding
section. First, the principal organizes the agents in a common workplace and in this
common workplace, they are able to observe each other from the outset. That is, each
expert knows not only the signal received by the other agents but also whether or not
the other agent exerts e⁄ort.
Second, as before, the principal o⁄ers a contract to each agent, and the team of
experts must produce a joint report ￿A 2 f￿A; ￿ ￿Ag, such that the group reports ￿ ￿A
when each expert obtains ￿ ￿, and ￿A otherwise.
14Given this message, the principal updates her belief about the future state of y and
chooses an action. Finally, the state is realized, the transfers are paid, and payo⁄s are
realized.
Therefore, the information available to each agent in each phase is the following:
i Whether or not the expert gathers information is not observable by the principal but
it is observable by the other group￿ s members.
ii The signal ￿i is not observable by the principal but it is observable by the other
experts in the communication phase.
Transfers are based on reports and on the policy￿ s outcome.
Optimal Contracts
The principal must provide incentives to the alliance or group of agents to acquire
information and also reveal it truthfully.
In this case, moral hazard incentive constraints on gathering information are such
that the group of agents will not prefer its members to remain uninformed and report
either ￿A or ￿ ￿A. Therefore:
2[p(￿ ￿A)v (￿ ￿A)￿ t + (1 ￿ p(￿ ￿A))t0 ￿ c] ￿ maxf2t0;2v￿ tg (10)
Moreover, the team should not prefer to base its report on only one signal. Thus,
2[p(￿ ￿A)v (￿ ￿A)￿ t + (1 ￿ p(￿ ￿A))t0 ￿ c] ￿ 2[p(￿ ￿)v (￿ ￿)￿ t + (1 ￿ p(￿ ￿))t0] ￿ c (11)
Likewise, the adverse selection constraints are the following two. If each team￿ s
member observes ￿ ￿, the team should prefer to report ￿ ￿A rather than ￿A. That is:
2v (￿ ￿A)￿ t ￿ 2to (12)
If alliance members observe either ￿￿ or ￿￿ ￿, the alliance should prefer to report ￿A
rather than ￿ ￿A. That is:
2to ￿ 2v￿ t 11 (13)
The incentive participation constraint for each team￿ s members is
p(￿ ￿A)v (￿ ￿A)￿ t + (1 ￿ p(￿ ￿A))t0 ￿ c ￿ 0: (14)
and the limited liability constraints are
￿ t ￿ 0;t0 ￿ 0 (15)
11See footnote 8.
15Hence, the principal￿ s program is:
minp(￿ ￿A)v (￿ ￿A)￿ t + (1 ￿ p(￿ ￿A))t0
subject to (10)-(15).
Lemma 2 When ￿ ￿ a > a ￿ 1
2, the optimal transfers are
￿ t =
c
v (1 ￿ v)(2￿ ￿ 1)
and t0 =
c
(1 ￿ v)(2￿ ￿ 1)
and, in this case, the agency￿ s cost (TCWS(B)) is
TCWS(B) = 2
￿
c(1 + (1 ￿ v)(2￿ ￿ 1))
(1 ￿ v)(2￿ ￿ 1)
￿
The principal￿ s net surplus is
￿
2vS + (1 ￿ ￿)
2 (1 ￿ v)F ￿ TCWS(B)
When ￿￿a > a￿ 1
2, the team of experts is always better o⁄collecting n = 2 signals
rather than only one. Therefore, if each agent in the group is better o⁄ collecting one
signal each, then each one will be better o⁄ reporting the truth, otherwise it would
not pay for these signals. Hence, the adverse selection problem is implied by the moral
hazard problem.
The agency￿ s cost expression is intuitive. We can rewrite it as:
TCWS(B) = 2
￿
c(1 + (1 ￿ v)(2￿ ￿ 1))
[p(￿ ￿Ajy = 1) ￿ p(￿ ￿A)]
￿
First recall that p(￿ ￿Ajy = 1) = ￿2. Therefore, as ￿ increases due to communication, it
is less costly to induce agents to reveal good news (￿ ￿￿ ￿) when they observe it. That is,
constraint (12) is relaxed, and in turn this also relaxes the moral hazard constraints.
Thus, the agency￿ s cost reduces as ￿ increases.
In contrast, as v increases, p(￿ ￿A) increases, and it is easier to correctly guess "good
news" without observing it. Thus, constraint (13) is tightened. In turn, it implies that
the moral hazard problem is more severe, hence, the agency cost will be higher.
Lemma 3 When ￿ ￿ a < a ￿ 1
2, the optimal transfers are
￿ t =
c
4v (1 ￿ v)(￿ ￿ a)
and t0 =
c
4(1 ￿ v)(￿ ￿ a)
and, in this case, the agency￿ s cost (TCWS(B)) is
TCWS(B) =
c(1 + (1 ￿ v)(2￿ ￿ 1))
2(1 ￿ v)(￿ ￿ a)
16The principal￿ s net surplus is
￿
2vS + (1 ￿ ￿)
2 (1 ￿ v)F ￿ TCWS(B)
When ￿￿a < a￿ 1
2, the group of agents is always better o⁄by collecting information,
but the principal must give incentives to experts to base the report on two signals rather
than only one. As the communication increases signal precision, i.e. as (￿ ￿ a) increases,
it is less costly for the decision-maker to induce the agents to tell the truth.
4.2.1 Communication: before or after?
In the present context, the principal, who exploits the synergy e⁄ects between experts,
allows communication between them. However, when agents are in communication,
they may collude against the principal. That is, experts may share in a credible way
their information, make a report that is jointly optimal for them and after that, ex-
change side-transfers.12
We may interpret this as follow. Exploiting the synergy between agents bears some
cost in terms of collusion. Consequently, is there any way to reduce that cost?
When the principal allows agents to communicate with each other before exerting
e⁄ort the principal is also allowing them to write a side-contract contingent not only on
the signal and the policy￿ s outcome, but also on their e⁄ort choices. Consequently, the
principal o⁄ers experts a contract such that the team (the coalition) of agents chooses
an e⁄ort pair which is optimal from principal￿ s point of view.
On the other hand, when communication is only possible after agents have exerted
e⁄ort each agent selects his own e⁄ort without knowing the other expert￿ s choice. In
other words, in this case, agents are not able to coordinate their selection of e⁄ort.
Proposition 2 In the presence of communication and synergy e⁄ects between experts,
the principal is better o⁄ by allowing the experts to communicate before they collect
information rather than after they exert e⁄ort.
Proof. By simple manipulation, it is easy to check that TCWS(F) ￿ TCWS(B) > 0,
regardless whether ￿ ￿ a Q a ￿ 1=2.
In other words, the principal is better o⁄ allowing agents to coordinate with each
other on their e⁄ort choices rather than no coordination at all. Let us observe that, in
both cases, i.e., before and after exerting e⁄ort, the coalition of agents can manipulate
the report sent to the principal. Consequently, in both cases, the team of experts
must be given incentives to reveal the truth. However, when the agents are able to
communicate from the outset, they are able to select an e⁄ort pair which they optimally
agree on.
12I assume enforcable side-contract between experts.
17The principal imposes more risk on the agents when she allows them to communicate
only after collecting information rather than before gathering information. We can
follow that by comparing inequalities (3) and (4) with (10).
Therefore, it is this coordination among experts in selecting e⁄ort that reduces the
agency cost of communication.
4.3 IWS versus CWS with synergy e⁄ects
At this point, the question is: Is the principal better o⁄allowing agents to communicate
with each other or not allowing them?
When agents communicate with each other, signals are more precise than when no
communication exists. This fact has not only a positive direct impact on the principal￿ s
surplus but it also makes the informational problem less severe. Additionally, when
communication between agents exists and experts are organized into a team of experts
from the outset, they are able to coordinate their e⁄orts. That is, the principal imposes
less risk on the experts because in this case, the group￿ s members can observe each other
and therefore they are able to coordinate their e⁄ort choices in collecting information.
Hence, the coordination between agents reduces the agency cost.
On the other hand, when no communication exists, the principal sacri￿ces precision
but she can take advantage of multiple reports and penalize con￿ icting messages.
Proposition 3 When ￿￿a > a￿1=2, the principal is better o⁄ allowing communication
between agents before they decide whether or not collect information rather than not
allowing any communication at all. When ￿ ￿ a < a ￿ 1=2, the principal may be better
o⁄ by allowing communication from the outset.
Proof. In the Appendix.
When ￿￿a > a￿1=2, we can easily show that TIWS > TCWS(B). When ￿￿a < a￿1=2,
the relationship between agency costs is reversed and TIWS < TCWS(B). Therefore, the
principal will be better o⁄ with communication if it su¢ ciently increase the principal￿ s
gross payo⁄.13
Therefore, if the signal￿ s precision increases su¢ ciently with communication, the
principal always prefers to allow communication between experts and to organize them
as a team from the outset rather than not allow communication at all.
5 Conclusion
The aim of this article is to understand how the organization of expertise a⁄ects the
production and transmission of accurate information by taking into account the incen-















su¢ ciently compensates the
di⁄erence TIWS ￿ TCWS(B):
18when communication among agents has con￿ icting consequences. On the one hand, I
assume that communication allows some synergies between agents to emerge. On the
other hand, communication also allows agents to collude among each other. We concen-
trate on an uninformed principal who has to elicit information from unbiased experts.
I study the optimal design of contracts in di⁄erent communication settings and I focus
on the organization of the expertise, specially in the communication phase. Experts
must decide whether to acquire costly information, and after that, if the communication
stage takes place, they send an aggregate report to the principal. In contrast, if there is
no communication among experts, each one sends the principal one individual report.
Accordingly, if the principal organizes experts such that communication is not possi-
ble, she avoids the collusion problem but she cannot take advantage of the cooperation
between agents. If communication takes place, it is better for the principal to form
a team of experts from the outset. This kind of organization enables the principal
not only to exploit the synergy e⁄ects among experts but also takes advantage of the
coordination of their e⁄ort choices. Thus, when the advantages of the synergy e⁄ects
outweigh the disadvantages of collusion, only horizontal communication from the outset
improves the principal￿ s welfare.
This article suggests some interesting avenues for research. One of them arises when
we ask the following question: what happens if synergies vary between agents? When
synergies between agent A and agent B di⁄er from synergies between agent A and agent
C, what is the optimal organization of expertise from the principal￿ s point of view?
Another interesting, and more realistic, avenue to study emerges when we relax
the assumption about the cost of communication. Up to now, we assume horizontal
communication is costless. When we assume that communication among agents is
costly (for example, communication is time-consuming; sometimes it is not easy to
"translate" certain speci￿c knowledge for an expert who has di⁄erent skills, and so on),
experts must be given incentives not only to gather costly initial information but also
to communicate among themselves. Consequently, what is the optimal organization of
expertise from the principal￿ s point of view?
Appendix
Proof Proposition 1
By simple manipulation, we obtain
TCWS ￿ TIWS = 2c
￿
(2a ￿ 1)v + p(￿ ￿)[a(2a ￿ 1)(1 ￿ v) + p(￿)]




Assume that t0 = v￿ t, then (5) is slack.
Since t0 = v￿ t, then RHS of (4) is greater than RHS of (3).
Assume that p(￿ ￿A)v (￿ ￿A)￿ t + (1 ￿ p(￿ ￿A))t0 ￿ c = p(￿ ￿)v (￿ ￿)￿ t + p(￿)t0
After simple manipulation, we get the transfers and the agency cost that are in the
19text.
At this level of transfers, we can check that the other inequalities hold.￿
Proof Lemma 2
Assume that t0 = v￿ t, then (12) is slack. Likewise, assume that (10) holds with
equality and (11) is slack.
By simple manipulation, when ￿ ￿ a > a ￿ 1=2, we ￿nd the transfers and agency
costs that are in the Lemma.￿
Proof Lemma 3
Assume that t0 = v￿ t, then (12) is slack. Likewise, assume that (11) holds with
equality and (10) is slack.
By simple manipulation, when ￿ ￿ a < a ￿ 1=2, we ￿nd the transfers and agency
costs that are in the Lemma.￿
Proof Proposition 2
Assume ￿￿a < a￿1=2. In such a case, it is easy to show that TCWS(A) > TCWS(B).
That is,
c(1 + (1 ￿ v)(2￿ ￿ 1))
(1 ￿ v)(￿ ￿ a)
>
c(1 + (1 ￿ v)(2￿ ￿ 1))
2(1 ￿ v)(￿ ￿ a)
When ￿ ￿ a > a ￿ 1=2, we can also show that TCWS(A) > TCWS(B). That is,
c(1 + (1 ￿ v)(2￿ ￿ 1))
(1 ￿ v)(￿ ￿ a)
> 2
￿
c(1 + (1 ￿ v)(2￿ ￿ 1))
(1 ￿ v)(2￿ ￿ 1)
￿
Since in these cases the gross payo⁄for the principal is the same (￿2vS+(1 ￿ ￿)
2 (1 ￿ v)F),
the principal will be always better o⁄ allowing agents to communicate with each other
before they exert e⁄ort.￿
Proof Proposition 3
When ￿ ￿ a > a ￿ 1=2, we ￿nd that TIWS > TCWS(B). That is,
2
￿
c[p(￿) + (1 ￿ v)(2a ￿ 1)a]




c(1 + (1 ￿ v)(2￿ ￿ 1))
(1 ￿ v)(2￿ ￿ 1)
￿
Since the gross payo⁄ for the principal when experts work in communication is
greater than the gross payo⁄ for the principal when they work in isolation i.e. ￿2vS +
(1 ￿ ￿)
2 (1 ￿ v)F > a2vS + (1 ￿ a)
2 (1 ￿ v)F, the principal always prefers to allow
agents to communicate with each other and from the outset.
However, when ￿ ￿ a < a ￿ 1=2, we can show that TIWS < TCWS(B). That is,
2
￿
c[p(￿) + (1 ￿ v)(2a ￿ 1)a]
(1 ￿ v)(2a ￿ 1)a
￿
>
c(1 + (1 ￿ v)(2￿ ￿ 1))
2(1 ￿ v)(￿ ￿ a)
Therefore, if
￿
￿2vS + (1 ￿ ￿)




a2vS + (1 ￿ a)
2 (1 ￿ v)F
￿
su¢ ciently
compensates the di⁄erence in the agency cost, the principal will be better o⁄by allowing
agents to communicate with each other from the outset.￿
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